Sometimes, we realize that the person we're in a relationship with views us in a way that diverges from how we view ourselves. The most common interpretation of this situation is that it is a threat to our autonomy, and that we should assert our "true" self in the face of how we're seen by others. Another interpretation suggests that this situation is an opportunity to develop a particular version of ourselves through a dialogue with the person we're in a relationship with. In other words, the way that they see us need not be worse than how we see ourselves, just different, and we may benefit from deferring to them, whether or not we find ourselves convinced by their way of seeing things. I find this alternative, more deferential interpretation appealing, but introduce and analyze a series of complications that arise when we try to apply it. My point is that the dialogue-based accounts of personal change and external influence must address these complications if they are to be applied to the messy, uncertain world of real relationships.

Presented at:

• Philadelphia Normative Philosophy Conference, October 2023

• APA Central Division Meeting, February 2024

Many popular philosophical accounts of apology and forgiveness view them in terms of abstract moral rights and wrongs. For example: an apology involves a perpetrator of some cruel action acknowledging that he's done something morally wrong, and forgiveness involves a victim granting that whatever wrong was done no longer "counts" against the perpetrator. Here, I reinterpret apology and forgiveness as being, not about abstract goodness and badness, but the context-specific norms of particular relationships. They are relevant when one side of a relationship violates certain particularly important expectations that the other side has for him, given how they understand their relationship to one another. Once we see things in this more locally-indexed way, we see that forgiveness doesn't merely involve the forgiver giving up her resentment or "undoing" the wrong that was done to her, but also defines the terms of the relationship moving forwards. That is to say, when certain important expectations of a relationship are violated, it presents a special opportunity to revise that relationship's expectations, a revision that is often expressed by the timing, content, and style of forgiveness.

Presented at the Annual meeting of the Mississippi Academy of Sciences, February 2023

It has become increasingly common for people to understand themselves and their behaviors using the language of psychiatric diagnoses. However, there is much reason to believe that the current system of psychiatric diagnosis is scientifically unsound — indeed, more and more researchers are suggesting that we shouldn't classify people as either having or not having certain diagnoses, but should instead classify people according to their location on a series of continua, without a clear distinction between healthy and pathological. I discuss how this potential scientific advance threatens to undermine social bonds formed on the basis of mental illness, raising thorny questions about the purpose of psychiatry.

Presented at:

• University of Florida - Florida State University Graduate Philosophy Conference, March 2022

• Great Lakes Philosophy Conference, April 2022

• APA Eastern Division Meeting, January 2023

Most philosophical accounts of self-deception draw a dichotomy between deception that comes from within oneself — a desire, intention, or emotion — and deception that comes from an external deceiver. These accounts tend to ignore that my intentions, emotions, or desires are not only my own; they often arise in response to social pressures. I discuss situations in which someone uses forms of leverage, such as by exploiting relational power dynamics or their victim's insecurities, to create and facilitate intentions, emotions, and desires in their victim that lead to false beliefs. The upshot is that an obsession with clearly differentiating self-deception and interpersonal deception tends to push a dangerous false dichotomy.

Presented at:

• Uehiro Graduate Conference, March 2022

• Georgia Philosophical Society Spring Meeting, June 2022

When deciding whether or not to do something, we might try to imagine ourselves in the future, looking back on the choice we made with gladness or regret. If we'll be glad that we did it, it's a good sign that we should do it; if we'll regret that we did it, it's a good sign that we shouldn't. This is often seen as a good strategy unless the decision itself turns us into someone who will be glad that we did it. That looks something like self-indoctrination or Stockholm Syndrome. I argue that it can in fact be a very good strategy, both because our identities are porous and dynamic, and because it allows us to make decisions with an eye towards personal growth.

Forthcoming in Aisthesis: Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico

Published in Aesthetic-Investigations, Vol. 7 No. 1 [link]

The latest film by Hiyao Miyazaki, The Boy and the Heron, unfolds in unexpected and occasionally baffling ways. The film’s second half, especially, takes place in a world that appears to abide by a distinct narrative logic than that which viewers are familiar with. I discuss this as an instance of Miyazaki creating and working within a private, authentic vocabulary, as has been described in Existentialist and Pragmatist traditions. Specifically, I analyze its filmic language as an alloy of the memories, imagined possibilities, and losses of two of its characters, and why this depiction is so affecting.

 Undergraduate Honors Thesis

I argue that intuitions about when it's right to blame someone get undermined by circumstantial moral luck — that is, the luck of facing or avoiding a morally-charged decision. For example, Thomas Nagel notes that while we should blame citizens of 1930s Germany who condoned the Nazi party, it's not clear how to treat people who would have condoned the Nazis had they lived in Germany, but happened to live in other countries where Nazis had no influence. It's odd to blame them for something they never did. It's odd that they should avoid blame exclusively because of where they happened to live. I then develop a new account of moral judgment, where we criticize someone when they fall short of some moral standard, even if it's only due to "bad luck," and blame someone when we empathize with their situation and believe that we would condemn ourselves had we done what they did. This supports a notion of blame as foremost a social practice, rather than a claim about moral facts. [final draft]

 Published in Stance: An Undergraduate Journal

I use the work of Søren Kierkegaard to discuss how music can convey philosophical thought in a way that prose cannot, relying on an analysis of a song that conveys some of Kierkegaard's ideas. (Is this kind of question-begging? Is it just cheeky? No Comment.) The song, Arcade Fire's Here Comes the Night Time, describes missionaries attempting to impose a particular version of Christianity onto the residents of Port-au-Prince, and (I argue) claims that a more legitimate Christianity is found in rejecting that imposition and committing to one's own relationship with God, which involves dancing through the darkness of uncertainty. Both what's being asserted in the song and the fact that it's being asserted by a song illustrates ideas from, not only Kierkegaard, but Susan Sontag's revolt "against interpretation." [published version]